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1 
Death Penalty Abolition and the Ratification of 
the Second Optional Protocol 
This article analyzes which factors promote or hinder ratification by nation-
states of the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, the only universal treaty aimed at the abolition of the 
death penalty. The study finds that a democratic regime, a left-wing oriented 
government, regional peer influence and a high level of economic 
development speed up ratification. A legal system built on common law and, if 
less robustly, ethnic fractionalization lower the likelihood of ratification. 
These results are compared to the determinants of domestic death penalty 
abolition. Besides similarities, one striking difference is that Eastern 
European country membership in the Council of Europe has been important 
for domestic abolition, but has had no influence on ratification of the Second 
Optional Protocol. Western European countries exerted pressure on Eastern 
European countries to abolish the death penalty, but did not extend their 
pressure towards a ratification of the Second Protocol. Also, whereas 
economic development does not matter for domestic abolition, an 
internationally binding commitment to abolition becomes more likely the 
richer the country. 
 
Keywords: Death penalty, capital punishment, abolition, international treaty, ratification 
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The continued existence of the death penalty in many countries of the world is highly 
contentious. It creates conflict and tensions between abolitionist countries and those retaining 
the death penalty (so-called retentionists). Governments of abolitionist countries routinely 
intervene if one of their citizens is threatened to become executed in a foreign country. Truly 
committed abolitionists believe that the death penalty violates basic human rights and are 
therefore not content with abolishing the penalty within their own jurisdiction only. Instead, 
they try to persuade and sometimes pressure retentionist countries into joining the abolitionist 
camp. This article examines what factors prompt countries to ratify or accede to the only 
international treaty aimed at the abolition of the death penalty that is not restricted to a 
particular region.1 This universal treaty is the Second Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty 
(hereafter: Second Protocol). It has been adopted with resolution 44/128 by the United 
Nations General Assembly as of 15 December 1989.  
The Second Protocol represents a milestone for the international abolitionist movement. 
The UN had passed resolutions on the use of the death penalty as early as 1959.2 The 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights from 1966 itself requires its State Parties 
to restrict the death penalty to ‘the most serious crimes in accordance with the law’ (Article 
6.2). It also sets up a number of safeguards for those facing the death penalty, which have 
been re-iterated and later on extended by (non-binding) UN resolutions. From the 1970s 
onwards the Secretary-General provided quinquennial reports on the use of the death penalty 
and in 1977 a resolution called for a restriction of the number of offences that could lead to 
capital punishment ‘with a view to the desirability of abolishing the punishment’.3 But the 
Second Protocol remains to date the most important and substantive achievement of 
abolitionist countries. In particular, it is the only universal international treaty that requires 
abolition of the death penalty.4 
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This article is structured as follows: The next section clarifies the relationship between 
domestic death penalty abolition and ratification of the Second Optional Protocol, arguing 
that ratification is the more far-reaching decision. We then discuss which factors are 
suggested by theory as determinants of ratifying this Protocol, focusing on political factors, 
which we argue to be more important than cultural, legal or social factors. This is followed by 
a presentation of the research design and the results of the empirical estimations, the 
implications of which are discussed in the final, concluding section. 
 
DEATH PENALTY ABOLITION AND THE SECOND PROTOCOL 
Eric Neumayer has provided an analysis of the political foundations underlying the global 
trend toward domestic death penalty abolition for all crimes as well as for ordinary crimes 
only in a cross-national sample over the period 1950 to 2001.5 (Countries abolitionist for 
ordinary crimes only allow the death penalty for exceptional crimes such as crimes 
committed during times of war or crimes committed in exceptional circumstances.) He argues 
that the major determinants are political in the form of democracy, partisan and regional peer 
pressure effects. Article 1 of the Second Protocol requires State Parties not to execute 
anybody and to undertake ‘all necessary measures to abolish the death penalty within its 
jurisdiction’ (Art. 1.2). So why study ratification of the Second Protocol at all then? Is it not 
simply synomymous to looking at domestic abolition of the death penalty? 
To start with, by far not all abolitionist countries are also state parties to the Second 
Protocol. In addition, there are at least three substantive reasons why an analysis of the 
determinants of Second Protocol ratification provides additional insight to analyzing the 
determinants of death penalty abolition within countries. First, the Second Protocol requires 
State Parties to undertake more ambitious and comprehensive measures than mere abolition. 
Whilst the Second Protocol allows ‘the application of the death penalty in time of war 
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pursuant to a conviction for a most serious crime of a military nature committed during 
wartime’ (Art. 2.1), such a reservation to the abolition clause in Article 1 is only admissible if 
it is made at the time of ratification or accession. In other words, countries that are 
abolitionist for ordinary crimes, but not State Parties, can change their legislation at any time 
to extend the scope of crimes considered punishable by death. Indeed, in principle they could 
even re-introduce the death penalty, even though in reality this is rarely done.6 State Parties 
cannot revert to or extend the scope of crimes considered punishable from the time of 
ratification onwards. Furthermore, a State Party making such a reservation must 
communicate to the Secretary-General of the UN the relevant legislative provisions 
applicable during wartime (Art. 2.2) and must notify the Secretary-General of any beginning 
or ending of a state of war (Art. 2.3). Countries, which have merely abolished the death 
penalty for ordinary crimes, but are not State Parties to the Second Protocol, are not subjected 
to any such restrictions. The Second Protocol therefore commits State Parties to a more 
restrictive application of the death penalty in times of war. 
Second, the Second Protocol opens the way to independent and international supervision 
of whether formally abolitionist countries actually comply with their commitment of 
abolition. Article 3 requires State Parties to report to the UN’s Human Rights Committee 
compliance measures undertaken that give effect to the Protocol. In case of non-fulfillment of 
its obligations, other State Parties (Article 4) as well as individuals subject to its jurisdiction 
(Article 5) can complain to the said Committee, which will consider such communication.7 
Third, in ratifying the Second Protocol, the State Parties make it clear that in their view 
the abolition of the death penalty is a necessary consequence of respect for basic human 
rights and that the continued existence of the penalty in retentionist countries therefore cannot 
be regarded as an internal domestic affair. The Preamble to the Second Protocol expresses the 
belief of State Parties that ‘abolition of the death penalty contributes to enhancement of 
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human dignity and progressive development of human rights’ with all measures of abolition 
to be considered as ‘progress in the enjoyment of the right to life’. Most importantly, it 
declares that the State Parties undertake ‘an international commitment to abolish the death 
penalty’ (emphasis added). Even though no specific measures are required from State Parties 
to persuade retentionist countries against capital punishment, it is clear that countries go 
beyond the mere domestic abolition of the death penalty in becoming State Parties to the 
Second Protocol. Indeed, this is why attempts by Italy and the Nordic countries in 1994 as 
well as the EU in 1999 to pass a UN resolution calling upon states to ratify the Second 
Optional Protocol were met with fierce resistance by retentionists and were unsuccessful.8 
Presumably, for these three reasons there are a great many abolitionist countries that are 
not State Parties to the Second Protocol, even though there are more abolitionist State Parties 
(54) than abolitionist non-State Parties (38). Table 1 provides a list of countries that are 
regarded as abolitionist for all crimes or at least abolitionist for ordinary crimes only by 
amnesty international together with information on whether and when they have ratified the 
Second Protocol.9 
 
< Insert Table 1 about here > 
 
POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF SECOND PROTOCOL RATIFICATION 
In this section, we look at which political factors theory would suggest as likely determinants 
of Second Protocol ratification. We start with international relations theories that focus on 
how external factors persuade or pressure countries to ratify. We then move on to theories 
that focus on internal or domestic factors, particularly theories of regime type (democracy vs. 
autocracy and the type and length of democratic regime) and partisan theories.  
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From a (neo-)realist perspective, powerful countries ratify international treaties and 
pressure less powerful countries into doing the same if this is in their perceived interest. 
Power is often approximated by population size and per capita income10 and much evidence 
suggests that more populous and more developed countries are more active members of the 
world system in that they negotiate, sign and ratify more international treaties in many areas 
of international co-operation than smaller and/or poorer countries, for example, in the area of 
environment11, monetary affairs12 and women’s rights13. However, the question is whether 
more powerful countries regard an international protocol aimed at the abolition of the death 
penalty to be in their own interest. With respect to the Second Protocol, the problem is that 
the United States (US), the most powerful country in the world, is divided into states that are 
retentionist and states that are abolitionist, with the retentionist states vastly outnumbering the 
abolitionist ones. No initiative can therefore be expected from the US. Japan, India and China 
are also retentionist. Western Europe, however, is totally abolitionist and has officially 
declared that it is ‘opposed to the death penalty in all cases and accordingly aims at its 
universal abolition’.14 Its 1998 Guidelines to EU Policy Towards Third Countries on the 
Death Penalty explicitly states that it ‘has now moved beyond’ abolition within its own 
political jurisdiction and ‘espouses abolition for itself and others’.15 This fits well into a 
realist account where powerful countries persuade or coerce weaker states into accepting 
international treaties that enshrine the powerful countries’ own norms. The good news to 
powerful countries is that shirking is hardly possible when it comes to the Second Protocol. It 
is relatively easily observable whether or not a country applies the death penalty and there is 
not much room for dispute over its application. This makes the Second Protocol different 
from human rights treaties where the abuse of human rights is more difficult to prove. Oona 
Hathaway argues that many countries ratify human rights treaties to deflect and disperse 
criticism of their human rights record.16 Stephen Krasner calls such behavior formal, but not 
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actual, endorsement of ‘the script of modernity’.17 However, this strategy cannot work with 
the Second Protocol as violation of the rule of abolition is easy to monitor. 
It is well documented that Western European countries have exerted pressure on Eastern 
European countries to abolish the death penalty.18 Abolition of the death penalty has been an 
important criterion for membership in the Council of Europe in the early 1990s and was made 
a formal requirement for entry in 1996. Eastern European countries considered membership 
in the Council of Europe as one foot in the door towards eventual desired membership in the 
European Union or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and were willing to 
succumb to the pressure from Western European countries and abolish the death penalty, 
often against the expressed will of a majority of citizens. The question is: Did Western 
European countries extend their pressure on Eastern European countries to become State 
Parties to the Second Protocol as well or were they already satisfied if these countries 
abolished the penalty domestically? 
Another theory of international relations called ‘external socialization’ argues that 
countries are likely to be influenced by the decisions of their regional peers with regards to 
whether to ratify an international treaty.19 If many countries within a region have ratified the 
Second Protocol, pressure mounts on the remaining ones to follow suit. Conversely, if few 
countries within a region have ratified the treaty, opponents of ratification will find it easier 
to defend their position and to reject criticism from home and abroad. It need not be pressure 
that matters as a realist account would suggest, however, but norm diffusion within regions 
sharing similar political cultures and histories can take place without any form of coercion 
involved.20 Such regional policy contagion dynamics working via communication, learning, 
imitation and altered reputational payoffs are well established in the literature on the 
diffusion of economic policies21 and have been documented for the ratification of human 
rights treaties22 and the acceptance of the authority of the international criminal court23. 
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Moving from theories that focus on external factors to theories focusing on internal or 
domestic factors instead, many abolitionists argue that the institution of the death penalty 
violates fundamental human rights. For example, the EU sees the death penalty as a ‘denial of 
human dignity’ and holds ‘that the abolition of the death penalty contributes to (…) the 
progressive development of human rights’.24 From this perspective, abolition of the death 
penalty is the logical result of a process of humanizing the penal system – either in its benign 
version forming part of a process of civilization and modernization analyzed by Elias25 or in 
its less benign Foucaultian26 version contributing to the sophistication of power and control 
as the penal system moves from violent punishment in the open to penitentiary correction 
behind closed prison doors. 
If the severity of punishment is a human rights issue then democracies can also be 
expected to be more willing to abolish the death penalty than autocracies. This is because 
democracies, almost by definition, are more willing to accept constitutional limits on 
governmental power and there is evidence that they respect better the human rights of their 
citizens.27 Along the same line of reasoning, it is not surprising that, with the exception of the 
United States, the countries making the most vigorous use of the death penalty are 
dictatorships. Robert Burt provides a different argument on the link between democracy and 
abolition when he maintains that the ‘democratic principle, properly understood, is inherently 
inconsistent with the practice’ of capital punishment since the death penalty rejects the 
democratic principle of equal citizenship and the (theoretical) possibility of reconciliation 
among adversaries.28 Corey Brettschneider similarly argues that the death penalty violates 
human dignity derived from free and equal citizenship in a democratic regime.29 Another 
reason why democracy might have a positive impact upon abolition is that the alleged 
deterrent effect of the death penalty is arguably strongest if the penalty is mandatory and 
applied without exception for certain types of crimes. Roger Hood argues that this ‘is not an 
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option for democratic states bound by the rule of law and concern for humanity and respect 
for human rights’.30 Austin Sarat pushes this argument further in expressing his concern that 
the practice of capital punishment undermines the legal values and the institutions constituent 
of democracy.31 
A caveat to keep in mind concerning the positive effect of democracy on abolition is that 
leadership by the political elite is important since in many countries abolition has been 
achieved against the majority opinion of the people.32 This also suggests that any positive 
link between democracy and abolition is not caused by the fact that democracies are more 
accountable to the will of the people. Rather, what matters is that most democracies might 
grant inviolable rights to individuals, even if they are criminals. Jack Donnelly warns, 
however, that not all democracies are necessarily respectful of human rights.33 The simple 
fact of electoral competition and democratic participation need not coincide with human 
rights protection. He argues that it is “liberal democracy” rather than democracy per se that 
matters, i.e. ‘a very specific kind of government in which the morally and politically prior 
rights of citizens and the requirement of the rule of law limit the range of democratic 
decision-making’.34 The unique character of state-determined criminal law and substantial 
laymen participation and influence on the extent of punitiveness of the criminal sanction 
system, which stir populist and demagogic penal policies, might provide hints why many 
states in the US maintain the death penalty and execute a great number of people.35 And yet, 
if we follow Foucault36 and take the employed penal technology itself seriously, then the 
trend towards more “humane”, “civilized” and “physically painless” executions in the US and 
other retentionist democracies might signal that in these countries even advocates of the death 
penalty understand that there is a fundamental conflict between capital punishment and the 
human rights and dignity typically afforded to citizens in democracies. 
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None of these arguments so far suggest, however, that democracies would want to go 
beyond domestic abolition. Such an argument can be derived from a liberal perspective 
though. From this perspective, a country’s willingness to ratify an international treaty is 
predominantly influenced by domestic politics. Domestic groups with an interest in death 
penalty abolition, be they non-governmental organizations, protest movements, political 
parties or any other group, pressure their domestic government into the ratification of human 
rights regimes.37 Obviously, there is more leeway for such pressure where the domestic 
political regime allows opposition and the exertion of peaceful political pressure on the 
government. Democracies are also more willing to accept limits on governmental power and 
discretion imposed by binding international treaties. 
Andrew Moravcsik argues, however, that not all democracies share the same willingness 
to accept legally binding international obligations.38 Recognising that ratification of an 
international treaty brings with it some constraint on domestic sovereignty, he argues that this 
cost needs to be balanced against the benefits of ratification, which comes from binding 
future policy makers to the current decision. Such self-binding can be beneficial if the current 
government wants to prevent future governments to revert to the death penalty again. He 
contends that newly established democracies have a much larger incentive to accept such 
constraints as policy makers regard the imposition of external constraints as a means for 
stabilising the recently established democracy and for dispersing domestic political 
uncertainty. An institutionalist international relations perspective would stress, however, that 
there are many more benefits from international treaties than merely self-binding, which help 
countries to reap the mutual, often long-term benefits of co-operation. For example, 
international human rights treaties provide a common human rights language, reinforce the 
universality of human rights, signal a consensus of the international community, create 
stigma for offenders, provide support to human rights campaigners and the like.39 From this 
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perspective, it seems more likely that the older and well established democracies with a 
longer tradition of human rights protection are more willing to forego national sovereignty in 
order to bring their long-cherished normative ideal to international recognition. 
International treaties are typically ratified by national parliaments, but governments need 
to sign them first. Countries with left-wing governments might be more likely to ratify the 
Second Protocol than countries with right-wing governments since left-wing politicians are 
less likely to subscribe to arguments of deterrence and retribution typically used to justify 
capital punishment.40 Some studies show that partisanship does indeed have an impact upon 
penal policies.41 In addition, left-wing governments often have a more internationalist 
orientation, which makes them more willing to commit to binding international treaties.42 
Todd Landman shows that countries ruled by leftist governments are more likely to ratify 
international human rights treaties and the death penalty issue is regarded as a human rights 
issue by abolitionists, even if this is contested by rententionists.43 Part of the reason for this 
partisan effect could be similar to the logic advanced by Moravscik44, namely to lock the 
country into the policy preferences of the current left-wing government. Jon C. Pennington 
argues that left-wing governments in English-speaking countries outside the US have often 
initiated a moratorium on the death penalty and have, after leaving office, obstructed attempts 
by right-wing parties to re-install the use of the death penalty.45 Ratification of an 
international treaty abolishing the death penalty would be even more effective than a 
temporary moratorium. 
A final political dimension is suggested by the fact that many countries maintain, for 
some time at least, the death penalty for offences committed during wartime even if they have 
abolished the death penalty for ordinary crimes. Quite a few countries have been much more 
hesitant to abolish the death penalty for all crimes than for ordinary crimes only. For 
example, Portugal and the Netherlands abolished the death penalty for ordinary crimes in 
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1867 and 1870, but for all crimes only in 1976 and 1982, respectively. Countries, which have 
experienced a longer history of warfare are likely to be more reluctant to abolish the death 
penalty for all crimes.46 Conversely, in countries, which have a long history of peace and are 
not likely to face war in the future, it makes less sense to retain the death penalty for treason 
and similar offences. However, since the Second Optional Protocol allows retention of the 
death penalty in time of war, admittedly with restrictions, political violent conflict need not 
have any impact on countries’ willingness to ratify the Protocol. 
 
OTHER DETERMINANTS OF SECOND PROTOCOL RATIFICATION 
Of course, political factors are not the only determinants of Second Protocol ratification. 
Culture and legal tradition as well as social factors can also have an effect on countries’ 
willingness to accept international commitments in general and commitments to abolish the 
death penalty in particular. In the discussions leading up to the conclusion of the Second 
Protocol, Pakistan maintained that abolition of the death penalty was not consistent with 
Islamic law.47 Many Islamic countries voted against a resolution calling for the drafting of the 
Second Protocol, citing the conformity of capital punishment with Islamic law as 
justification.48 The same happened when it came to a vote on the actual resolution passing the 
Second Protocol in the General Assembly.49 The Sudanese representative to the UN stated in 
1994: ‘Capital punishment is a divine right of some religions. It is embodied in Islam and 
these views must be respected’.50 One would therefore expect countries with a predominantly 
Muslim population not to ratify the Second Protocol. However, looking at table 1 reveals that 
four such countries have so far ratified it, namely Azerbeijan in 1999, Turkmenistan in 2000, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2001 and Djibouti in 2002. Still, the vast majority of Muslim 
countries are not State Parties. 
 13 
Britain in the 19th century was a staunch believer in the death penalty with a high 
execution rate well above that of continental European countries.51 With the spread of the 
British empire the common law legal system and the death penalty came to be applied in its 
colonies. Such legal and penal traditions can impact upon what are regarded as culturally and 
socially acceptable forms of punishment. Many common law Caribbean countries in 
particular are outspoken defenders of the death penalty. In common law ‘the customs of the 
people provide the original source of the law’52, rather than the decisions of rulers and 
legislators. Many important legal decisions are set by judiciary precedent and interpretation 
of the law by the court. Legally binding international commitments essentially bypass the 
evolutionary emergence and development of common law. In contrast, civil law countries 
find it relatively easy to incorporate rules from international treaties into their codified legal 
system. This might suggest that common law countries are more reluctant to accept legally 
binding rules imposed via internationally binding obligations and in combination with the 
long retentionist tradition of many common law countries would lead one to expect that they 
are less likely to ratify the Second Protocol.  
Some suggest that the death penalty is employed as an instrument of social control over 
ethnic minorities and the perceived threat emanating from them.53 The death penalty can be 
used as a demonstration of the ultimate power of the state over the life of its citizens and 
ethnic divisions prompt politicians to take a tough stance on crime. Evidence suggests that 
cities, metros and counties in the US spend more on police and less on productive public 
expenditures if they are more ethnically diverse.54 The conflict study literature suggests that 
ethnically more diverse societies lack social cohesion and might experience more violence 
and conflict.55 One would therefore expect that such countries are less likely to commit to 
internationally binding rules banning the death penalty and thus taking away the most 
powerful sanction available to keep ethnic minorities in check. 
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RESEARCH DESIGN 
There are basically two approaches for examining the determinants of Second Protocol 
ratification. One is to simply look at whether a country has ratified the Protocol or not. In this 
case, the dependent variable is a dichotomous one, for which estimation techniques such as 
probit or logit are most suitable. The other approach is to look at the speed by which 
countries ratify the Second Protocol, if at all. The dependent variable in this case is therefore 
a continuous time variable. One possible estimation technique for this method is the Cox 
proportional hazards model, also known as a survival model.56 It assumes that there is a time-
variant underlying base hazard of ratification at any point of time that depends on unobserved 
variables, possibly in a complex way. Observed control variables increase or lower this base 
hazard by a constant proportional amount. The proportionality assumption is critical, but its 
validity can be tested. More formally, let ρ(t) be the probability of ratification at time t; this is 
the hazard of ratification. Denoting ρ0(t) the exogenous baseline hazard, which reflects those 
time-dependent factors affecting ρ(t) that are common to all countries, the Cox proportional 
hazard model assumes that 
 
ρ(t) = ρ0(t)exp(βTx(t)),      (1) 
 
where x(t) is a vector of covariates shifting the baseline hazard, and βT is a vector of 
parameters to be estimated. Countries become “at risk” of ratification in 1990, the year the 
Second Protocol became open to ratification, or the year of their national independence, if 
later. A maximum likelihood estimation is carried out, where the likelihood function is 
constructed using the observation that the probability that country i ratifies at time ti equals 
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Both approaches have their respective advantages and disadvantages. The first approach 
is conceptually clear: a country either ratifies the Second Protocol or not. Also, probit and 
logit are widely used estimation techniques familiar to most social scientists. The second 
method is conceptually somewhat less clear. Early ratification demonstrates a great 
commitment to the cause. Indeed, it is typically only after a minimum number of countries 
have ratified a treaty that it comes into force. For example, Article 8:1 of the Second Protocol 
specifies that it enters into force three months after ten countries have notified to the 
Secretary-General of the UN their ratification of the treaty or their accession to it.57 However, 
while early ratification shows commitment, a delay in ratification can be caused by many 
factors other than lack of commitment. For example, some countries might find it difficult to 
achieve early ratification due to the peculiarities of their political system. The great advantage 
of the second approach is that it allows for greater variation among countries since the 
dependent variable is not simply a dichotomous one. Indeed, the introduction of a time 
dimension allows us to test for the external socialization theory of regional norm diffusion 
over time. For these reasons we prefer the second approach.  
The dependent variable is set to zero until the year a country ratifies or otherwise accedes 
to the Protocol, after which it drops out of the sample. Time is measured in discrete rather 
than continuous time since the explanatory variables are only available in discrete annual 
form.58 The period of study ends in 2002. Of course, the Second Protocol is still open to 
ratification and accession, which Paraguay and Timor-Leste have done in 2003 and Estonia, 
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Czech Republic and San Marino have done in 2004, but 2002 represents the end of our study 
period due to lack of data for the explanatory variables. 
With respect to the explanatory variables, we measure power by the log of population size 
and by the level of economic development as approximated by the log of per capita income.59 
As a crude proxy for the difficult to measure pressure that Western European countries might 
have exerted on Eastern European countries, a dummy variable was set to one for the years in 
which an Eastern European country has been a member of the Council of Europe.60 The 
average share of countries within a region that have ratified the Second Protocol in the 
previous year is supposed to capture regional diffusion effects. The regions follow the 
boundaries of the three existing regional human rights regimes, which exist in the Americas, 
in Africa and Europe including Russia and the Caucasus republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan 
and Georgia. The two remaining regions have no regional regimes, namely the Middle East 
and Asia. The regional diffusion variable is not without problems, however. In effect, it 
introduces a spatial lag into the model and often captures variables omitted from the model.61 
We believe our model is relatively comprehensive, but it would be difficult to say with 
confidence that there are no omitted variables. For this reason, we only include the regional 
diffusion variable in additional estimations. 
The Polity IV project provides the most commonly used measure of democracy in 
political science.62 The data are derived from expert judgment on aspects of institutionalized 
democracy and autocracy within a country, both measured on an additive 0 to 10 scale. The 
autocracy score is deducted from the democracy score to create a variable that runs from –10 
to 10. In most regressions, we will use data from the competing Freedom House measure, 
however.63 This is for two reasons: First, Freedom House data are available for more 
countries than the Polity data, which are typically restricted to countries with a population 
size of more than one million. Second, the Freedom House measure is closer to the “liberal 
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democracy” ideal, which Donnelly64 argues to be important for human rights protection, 
whereas the Polity measure refers more to electoral competition and democratic decision-
making, which are procedural characteristics of democracy. Freedom House provides two 
indices based on surveys among experts assessing the extent to which a country effectively 
respects political rights and civil liberties, both measured on a 1 (best) to 7 (worst) scale. 
Political rights refer to, for example, the existence and fairness of elections, existence of 
opposition and the possibility to take over power via elections. Civil rights typically refer to 
such rights as the freedom of speech, the freedom of assembly and association and the 
freedom of religious expression. A combined freedom index was constructed by adding the 
two indices and reverting the index, such that it ranges from 2 (least democratic) to 14 (most 
democratic). There is one exception to our rule of generally using the Freedom House 
measure, however. In one regression, we enter the number of years a country has been an 
established democracy as an explanatory variable. For this, we resort to the Polity measure 
since it goes back to 1800 and therefore goes back much further in time than the Freedom 
House data, which only start in 1972. 
To test for partisan effects, we use a dummy variable that is set to one if the chief 
executive’s party is considered as left-wing (mainly communist, socialist and social 
democratic parties) by our source.65 Unfortunately, this variable is only available until 2000. 
To test the impact of historical experience with armed political conflict on Second Optional 
Protocol ratification we use data from the Uppsala Project.66 Our variable measures the 
number of years that have passed since the last incident of an armed political conflict with at 
least 25 casualties. In sensitivity analysis we found that it makes no difference to the results 
reported below if we separate peace years since last civil war from peace years since last 
inter-state war events or account for the intensity of the last conflict. 
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We use a dummy variable for countries considered to have a predominantly Muslim 
population67, and another one for countries whose legal system is based on English common 
law.68 Finally, our measure of ethnic fractionalization is provided by Tatu Vanhanen.69 He 
distinguishes three types of ethnic groups, namely groups based on, first, racial differences, 
second, linguistic, national or tribal differences and, third, religious differences. Vanhanen 
takes 100 minus the percentage of the largest group in each type of ethnic group as a proxy 
for fractionalization in each group and then sums the resulting percentages across all three 
groups to arrive at the aggregate measure of fractionalization. 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the variables together with a bivariate correlation 
matrix. 
 
< Insert Table 2 about here > 
 
RESULTS 
Table 3 reports results for the Cox proportional hazard model with ratification delay as the 
dependent variable. All estimations are based on a robust variance estimator and observations 
are assumed to be clustered, that is, are assumed to be independent only across countries, but 
are allowed to be correlated within countries over time. Since the same set of countries 
appear repeatedly over time in the sample, a failure to take clustering into account would 
under-estimate standard errors. Note that the reported results are hazard ratios, which cannot 
become negative. A hazard ratio lower than one signals that an increase in the variable lowers 
the hazard of ratification, whereas a hazard ratio greater than one means that an increase in 
the variable raises the hazard of ratification.70 The proportional hazards assumption 
underlying the Cox estimator can be statistically tested with the help of Schoenfeld residuals. 
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Such tests fail to reject the assumption at the 10 per cent significance level throughout. This 
suggests that the Cox estimator reports valid results. 
We start with a regression in column I of table 3, in which only the Muslim, common law 
and Council of Europe membership dummies together with population size, democracy, the 
number of peace years and the measure of ethnic fractionalization are entered. This 
regression can draw on the greatest sample size. As expected, countries with a legal system 
built on English common law and ethnically more fractionalized countries are less likely, 
whereas more democratic countries are more likely to have ratified the Second Protocol 
(early on). The coefficients of the Council of Europe membership and the Muslim dummy 
variables as well as the number of peace years and population size are statistically 
insignificant, however. 
 
< Insert Table 3 about here > 
 
The insignificance of the Muslim dummy variable is particularly striking. What explains 
the absence of a statistically significant effect? If one were to re-run the regression of column 
I without the democracy variable, then the Muslim dummy variable becomes highly 
statistically significant. A strong correlation between the lack of democracy and a 
predominantly Muslim population is well known.71 The results therefore suggest that it is the 
lack of democracy in many Muslim countries rather than their being Muslim per se, which 
inhibits ratification of the Second Protocol. 
In column II, we add per capita income, which leads to a reduction in sample size. 
Economic development speeds up ratification of the Second Protocol. The ethnic 
fractionalization variable retains its negative coefficient sign, but becomes marginally 
statistically insignificant, whereas more populous countries are now estimated to be less 
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rather than more likely to ratify (early on). The other variables are hardly affected. In column 
III, we add the political orientation of the chief executive’s party to the estimated model, 
which leads to a further reduction in sample size. A left-wing political orientation speeds up 
ratification. The other variables are again little affected. Ethnic fractionalization becomes 
statistically significant again with a hazard ratio below one, as theory would predict. There is 
evidence for regional diffusion as a higher average of ratifications within a region in the 
previous year speeds up ratification when this variable is added to the model in column IV. 
Crucially, all the other variables remain the same in terms of statistical significance. Finally, 
in column V we want to test the impact of length of democratic experience on ratification. To 
do so, we construct a variable that measures the number of years since 1800 a country has 
continuously been a democracy, defined as a Polity value of 6 or above.72 Unfortunately, this 
variable cannot be included in the estimations alongside the Freedom House measure as the 
two variables are very highly correlated with each other (r = 0.6). The reported results in 
column V show that it is the longer established democracies that ratify the Second Protocol 
early on as the coefficient of the variable measuring the years of democracy has a hazard ratio 
above one that is statistically significant. The other variables are hardly affected. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Our results suggest that regional diffusion, democracy, economic development, the left-wing 
orientation of the chief executive’s party, common law and ethnic fractionalization are 
determinants of ratification of the only universal treaty aimed at the abolition of the death 
penalty. How do these results compare to the determinants of death penalty abolition 
domestically?73 Regional diffusion and democracy are consistent and robust determinants for 
both. However, contrary to Moravcsik’s suggestion74 we find that it is not the newly 
established, but the old democracies, which are more likely to ratify the Second Protocol 
 21 
(early on). In many newly established democracies, particularly, but not exclusively in 
Eastern Europe, abolition of the death penalty was undertaken due to outside pressure with 
little domestic enthusiasm for it, which might partly explain this result.75 
Partisan effects are apparent both in domestic abolition and in ratification of the Second 
Protocol. This suggests that left-wing oriented governments take the opportunity to lock-in 
their preference for abolition. Some of the other results are also compatible. For example, in 
some estimations we find that ethnically more fractionalized countries are less likely to ratify 
the Second Protocol and they are also less likely to have abolished the death penalty 
domestically. Countries with a predominantly Muslim population are not less likely to have 
ratified the Second Protocol once democracy is controlled for. This mirrors the finding that 
the share of Muslim population has no consistent and robust effect on death penalty abolition 
either. It is also noteworthy that whilst there are only six countries with a predominantly 
Muslim population that have abolished the death penalty, only two of these have not also 
ratified the Second Protocol (Turkey and Albania, which has however signed it at least). 
Similar to domestic death penalty abolition, no evidence is found that historical experience of 
violent political conflicts has an effect on the likelihood of ratifying the Second Optional 
Protocol. Our analysis suggests that such experience is not likely to impose a barrier on 
abolition, dispersing a concern raised by Dunér and Geurtsen in this journal.76 
It is re-assuring that some of the main determinants of death penalty abolition within 
countries in a global sample spanning the time period of more than half a decade (1950 to 
2001) are broadly similar to the determinants of Second Protocol ratification from the 1990s 
onwards. This similarity in results suggests that the variables included do not simply fit one 
specific set of data, but really capture the fundamental drivers of abolition. Having said that, 
there are also three main differences between the results on domestic death penalty abolition 
and the results reported here. 
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First, a common law legal system is more consistently related to a lower likelihood of 
Second Protocol ratification than it is to a lower likelihood of domestic death penalty 
abolition. What this suggests is that even if common law countries abolish the death penalty, 
they are reluctant to delegate authority and sovereignty about the issue to an international 
regime. As mentioned above, internationally binding commitments essentially bypass the 
evolutionary process of law development by judiciary precedent and are therefore less easily 
compatible with a common law than with a civil law system, which might explain the 
difference in results. 
Second, the level of economic development is a determinant of Second Protocol 
ratification, but not of domestic death penalty abolition. The latter confirms the observation 
that many rich countries like Japan, Singapore and the United States retain the death penalty 
whilst many poor countries have abolished it. Hence aversion against capital punishment in 
itself does not really seem to be what economists call a normal good, that is a good for which 
demand rises with rising income. Instead, what seems to be a normal good is an international 
commitment to abolition. This is in accordance with the fact that with the exception of 
Canada and France all Western developed abolitionist countries have also ratified the Second 
Protocol such that the abolitionist non-State Parties are almost exclusively Eastern European 
and developing countries. More research is needed to find out why the level of economic 
development is a significant determinant of Second Protocol ratification, but not of death 
penalty abolition as such. One likely explanation is that richer countries generally are more 
willing and capable to negotiate, sign and ratify international treaties. In as much as economic 
development leads to power in the international system, realist theories would predict that 
richer countries are more likely to ratify. However, we do not find such an effect for 
population size. Indeed, in some estimations we find that more populous countries are less 
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rather than more likely to ratify. All in all, the evidence in favor of a realist account is 
therefore limited. This leads us to the final and most striking difference in results. 
Third, the single greatest difference between the determinants of death penalty abolition 
and Second Protocol ratification is with respect to the Council of Europe membership dummy 
variable. This variable is a highly significant determinant of domestic death penalty abolition, 
but it is statistically insignificant as a determinant of Second Protocol ratification in all 
regressions. What this suggests is that Western European countries did not extend their 
pressure on Eastern European countries towards a ratification of the Second Protocol. Once 
Eastern European countries had abolished the death penalty within their jurisdiction and had 
become Parties to the Protocol No. 6 to the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights, Western European abolitionist countries were satisfied. Future research 
should address the question why Western European countries, all of which are Parties to the 
Second Protocol except France, did not go all the way in exerting pressure on Eastern 
European countries and demanded that they join the Second Protocol as well. This failure is 
unfortunate from the perspective of the global abolitionist movement since it is only the 
Second Protocol that has a universal coverage. It also puts the extent of EU commitment to 
promoting the international agenda for death penalty abolition in some doubt. If more Eastern 
European abolitionist countries had become Parties to the Second Protocol, this would have 
rendered the treaty more successful and would have put more pressure on the remaining 
abolitionist and perhaps even retentionist countries to join. There is certainly no point for 
Western European countries to initiate a United Nations resolution aimed at encouraging 
countries to ratify the Second Optional Protocol if they cannot even persuade their Eastern 
European partner countries to do so. 
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Table 1. Abolitionist State Parties and non-State Parties (as of April 2005). 
State Parties to the Second Protocol 
(Total number: 54) 
Year of 
ratification/accession 
 Abolitionist non-State Parties 
(Total number: 38) 
Australia 1990  Albania*# 
Austria 1993  Andorra 
Azerbaijan 1999  Angola 
Belgium 1998  Argentina* 
Bosnia and Herzegovina* 2001  Armenia* 
Bulgaria 1999  Bolivia* 
Cape Verde 2000  Brazil* 
Colombia 1997  Cambodia 
Costa Rica 1998  Canada 
Croatia 1995  Chile*# 
Cyprus 1999  Cook Islands* 
Czech Republic 2004  Côte d’Ivoire 
Denmark 1994  Dominic Republic 
Djibouti 2002  El Salvador* 
Ecuador 1993  East Timor 
Estonia 2004  Fiji* 
Finland 1991  France 
Georgia 1999  Guinea-Bissau# 
Germany 1992  Haiti 
Greece* 1997  Honduras# 
Hungary 1994  Israel* 
Iceland 1991  Kiribati 
Ireland 1993  Latvia* 
Italy 1995  Marshall Islands 
Liechtenstein 1998  Mauritius 
Lithuania 2002  Mexico* 
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Luxembourg 1992  Micronesia 
Macedonia, FYR 1995  Moldova 
Malta 1994  Nicaragua# 
Monaco 2000  Palau 
Mozambique 1993  Peru* 
Namibia 1994  Poland# 
Nepal 1998  São Tome e Principe# 
Netherlands 1991  Solomon Islands 
New Zealand 1990  Tuvalu 
Norway 1991  Turkey*# 
Panama 1993  Ukraine 
Paraguay 2003  Vanuatu 
Portugal 1990   
Romania 1991   
San Marino 2004   
Seychelles 1994   
Slovak Republic 1999   
Slovenia 1994   
South Africa 2002   
Spain 1991   
Sweden 1990   
Switzerland 1994   
Timor-Leste 2003   
Turkmenistan 2000   
United Kingdom 1999   
Uruguay 1993   
Venezuela 1993   
Yugoslavia, FR (Serbia/Montenegro) 2001   
 
* Abolitionist for ordinary crimes only. # Signed, but not ratified. 
Source: http:// www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/12.htm and http://web.amnesty.org. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistical information and bivariate correlation matrix. 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Ratification delay 1900 0.02 0.15 0 1 
Council of Europe 1900 0.05 0.21 0 1 
Common law 1900 0.36 0.48 0 1 
Ethnic fractionalization 1900 45.61 36.74 0 177 
Islam 1900 0.31 0.46 0 1 
Democracy 1900 7.94 3.87 2 14 
Years of democracy 1635 9.75 25.95 0 191 
Peace years 1900 19.5 20 0 52 
Population (ln) 1900 15.61 2.01 10.62 20.99 
GDP p.c. (ln) 1454 8.18 1.02 5.64 10.41 
Left-wing executive 1553 0.29 0.45 0 1 
Regional ratification (lagged) 1900 0.08 0.12 0 0.64 
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Ratification 
delay 
Council 
of Europe 
Common 
law 
Ethnic 
fractionalization 
Islam Democracy Years of 
democracy 
Population 
(ln) 
Peace 
years 
GDP p.c. 
(ln) 
Left-wing 
executive 
Council of Europe 0.03           
Common law -0.04 -0.16          
Ethnic fractionalization -0.11 -0.08 0.24         
Islam -0.09 -0.11 -0.12 0.22        
Democracy 0.16 0.20 0.15 -0.16 -0.41       
Years of democracy 0.16 -0.08 0.23 -0.15 -0.24 0.53      
Population (ln) -0.01 -0.04 0.02 -0.04 0.06 -0.04 0.16     
Peace years 0.04 0.29 0.01 -0.03 -0.27 0.31 0.04 -0.32    
GDP p.c. (ln) 0.17 0.13 0.01 -0.24 -0.23 0.58 0.52 0.10 0.19   
Left-wing executive 0.06 0.00 0.09 0.01 -0.14 0.11 0.13 0.08 0.09 0.01  
Regional ratification (lagged) 0.10 0.62 -0.16 -0.15 -0.14 0.26 0.08 0.02 0.15 0.28 0.01 
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Table 3. Estimation results for ratification delay of the Second Protocol. 
 I II III IV V 
Council of Europe 1.096 1.298 1.066 0.475 0.815 
 (0.17) (0.49) (0.10) (0.90) (0.26) 
Common law 0.281*** 0.256*** 0.253*** 0.330** 0.456 
 (2.95) (2.71) (2.61) (2.21) (1.63) 
Ethnic fractionalization 0.992* 0.993 0.987** 0.987** 0.982*** 
 (1.67) (1.32) (2.57) (2.49) (2.58) 
Islam 0.489 0.320 0.319 0.349 0.272 
 (0.94) (1.04) (1.05) (0.98) (1.23) 
Democracy 1.412*** 1.204** 1.166** 1.161*  
 (4.58) (2.51) (2.03) (1.90)  
Peace years 0.987 0.987 0.987 0.993 0.990 
 (1.17) (1.24) (1.29) (0.63) (0.88) 
Population (ln) 0.992 0.853* 0.779*** 0.796** 0.687*** 
 (0.09) (1.69) (2.62) (2.44) (2.76) 
GDP p.c. (ln)  2.007*** 2.027*** 1.656** 1.945*** 
  (3.14) (3.01) (2.20) (2.78) 
Left-wing executive   2.060** 1.816* 2.175** 
   (2.10) (1.66) (2.12) 
Regional ratification (t-1)    49.514* 57.740** 
    (1.81) (2.08) 
Years of democracy     1.009** 
     (2.29) 
Log likelihood -173.5 -149.0 -132.0 -130.1 -113.3 
Global χ2 test propor-
tional hazard (p-value) 
5.13 
(0.645) 
4.01 
(0.856) 
5.40 
(0.798) 
7.11 
(0.715) 
8.46 
(0.584) 
Countries 171 155 149 149 139 
Observations 1900 1454 1208 1208 1131 
 
Note: Cox proportional hazard estimation. Observations assumed to be 
independent across, but not necessarily within countries (clustering). Reported 
coefficients are hazard ratios. Absolute z-values in parentheses. 
* significant at p < 0.1; ** at p < 0.05; *** at p < 0.01. 
